China’s Pacific Island Strategy and Regional Security

“Don’t be too anxious and don’t be too nervous” - words of reassurance from China’s foreign minister Wang Yi directed towards representatives from ten Pacific Island states. Following a diplomatic tour of the region, Beijing’s top diplomat failed to reach a consensus with his Pacific Island counterparts on a comprehensive economic and security agreement, known as the China-Pacific Island Countries Common Development Vision.

A draft communique and five-year action plan sent to ten Pacific Island states ahead of the meeting held on May 30, 2022, noted that the agreement extended China’s efforts to: train local law enforcement; expand regional political ties; conduct sensitive marine mapping; engage in regional cybersecurity and internet management; secure access to natural resources and fisheries; and cooperate on “traditional and non-traditional security.” In return, Beijing committed millions of dollars in financial assistance and promised to create a China-Pacific Island free trade agreement.

Wang Yi’s Diplomatic Tour Across the South Pacific. Source: Financial Times.

In addition to encouraging exchanges between the “governments, legislatures and political parties” of signatory states, the draft agreement further stipulated that Pacific Island states must “firmly abide” by Beijing’s one-China principle - which firmly asserts that Taiwan is a part of China. Moreover, the agreement would hold its signatories to the principle of “non-interference” - a clause often cited by Beijing to deter criticism directed at China’s human rights record.

“The fact that China is devoting resources to this [Pacific] region speaks to Beijing’s global ambitions.” - Benjamin Herscovitch, Research Fellow at the Australian National University’s National Security College

Although China failed to reach a regional consensus on the sweeping pact, it had succeeded in signing multiple bilateral agreements throughout Yi’s diplomatic tour. Additionally, Beijing was able to to reach an agreement on five areas of cooperation with Samoa, Tonga, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, and Niue. For its part, China agreed to back the signatories in their post-pandemic economic recovery; combat climate change; and develop new centers for agriculture and disaster management. Notably missing from this agreement were articles outlining avenues for cooperation on security and defence.

Three Pillars of Engagement: Power, Alignment, Deterrence

China’s most recent efforts to secure a deal with Pacific Island states is only the latest iteration of Beijing’s grander strategy for the region. Over the last three decades, China has gradually sought to expand its political, economic, and military influence across the Indo-Pacific. Although the South Pacific is not on top of Beijing’s geostrategic priorities, particularly when compared to the South China Sea and Southeast Asia, the region holds immense strategic value to any power seeking to exert its influence over the Indo-Pacific and East Asia.

Understanding Beijing’s South Pacific strategy first requires an examination of three key policy priorities in line with China’s long-term strategic objectives in the region, specifically: the development of a flexible military doctrine reliant on force projection and underpinned by a capable navy; the alignment of Pacific island states with China’s economic and security framework; and countering the influence of the United States and its allies - specifically Australia.

China’s Maritime Military Doctrine: The Nexus of Force Projection and Geopolitical Ambition

On June 17, 2022, China officially launched its third aircraft carrier. The Fujian, China’s first fully domestically developed aircraft carrier, joins the Soviet-era Liaoning and the Shandong. A fourth carrier currently being built is rumored to be nuclear-powered. The Fujian’s launch is the latest effort by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to modernize its fleet in an effort to boost its power projection capabilities. The significant expansion of the PLAN, and the development of a comprehensive maritime strategy, under President Xi Jinping serves three purposes.

The Fujian at a Drydock in Shanghai, China, on June 17, 2022. Source: Xinhua.

First, it enables Beijing to project its power and influence far beyond its immediate shores - a capability of ever increasing importance to China in light of its multi-trillion dollar One-Belt-One-Road global investment initiative. As China continues to expand its economic influence, it will increasingly require a capable and modern navy to protect its geopolitical interests, secure strategic waterways, and defend its access to overseas ports.

Second, China seeks to counter the ever increasing US naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region. Policy makers in Beijing are cognizant of the distrust and suspicion China faces from its immediate neighbors, many of whom resent its aggressive claims and expansion in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, Beijing considers a powerful navy to be its first line of defence against the United States and its regional allies, and the most important institution to back its regional and territorial ambitions.

Third, a dependable navy capable of accessing overseas ports would allow Beijing to bypass the traditional security zones of Washington’s “Island Chain Strategy” - a geographic security concept crafted by the United States in the 1940’s as a defensive measure to deter and contain the Soviet Union and China. Although China has maintained a notable presence in the first island chain through its aggressive territorial claims in the South China Sea and significant investments in aeronautical, military, and defence infrastructure, it is unable to exert full control over the first chain without direct control of Taiwan.

China has also attempted to leverage economic support in the second island chain to align states with its strategic objectives. In September 2019, promises of financial support for the Solomon Islands and Kiribati led to both states revoking their diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. Efforts to engage Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands, however, have proven to be much more difficult due to their preexisting agreements with the United States, granting Washington exclusive access to strategic land, air, and sea routes. Specific references to the one-China policy in the China-Pacific Island Vision’s May 2022 draft communique are a testament of Beijing’s commitment to isolate Taiwan politically. Only four Pacific Island states continue to maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan - the Marshall Islands; Nauru; Palau; and Tuvalu.

Map Depicting the First and Second Lines of the “Island Chain Strategy”. Source: US Army War College.

Developing a capable navy in tandem with fostering closer political, economic, and security ties with Pacific Island states beyond the second island chain would enable Beijing to project its power from beyond the constraints of Washington’s first island chain. China’s political and military leadership are also likely aware of the significant challenges posed by any attempted forceful occupation of Taiwan, particularly in light of Russia’s poor performance in Ukraine. Rather, it is more likely that Beijing will continue pursuing a steady path to becoming a regional hegemonic rival to the United States by investing in the modernization of its ground, naval, air, and missile forces; and gradually circumventing Washington’s island chain strategy by expanding its economic and political spheres of influence.

Aligning the Pacific Islands with Economic and Security Priorities

In addition to hundreds of millions of dollars worth of trade agreements and financial aid programs, between 2013 and 2018 China’s direct investment in Pacific Island states rose from $900 million to $4.5 billion - a 400 percent increase. Although China’s engagement in the South Pacific appears to be a benign extension of economic lifelines to developing states in exchange for fostering bilateral and multilateral cooperation on trade and development, China’s centralized and state-dominated economy often results in the forced coupling of economic activities with Beijing’s broader geopolitical, strategic, and military priorities.

Beyond their geostrategic value for the PLAN and China’s wider maritime strategy, Pacific Island states could play a key role as possible partners in Beijing’s Pacific economic and security framework, particularly in the context of the One-Belt-One-Road project. In pursuing this framework, China is determined to secure three primary objectives, specifically: disrupting Taiwan’s efforts to gain international recognition and limiting its ability to engage with neighboring states; accessing natural resources; and expanding China’s commercial and military maritime domain.

Map Depicting the Status of Diplomatic Recognition of Taiwan by Pacific Island States. Source: The Diplomat.

An agreement signed between China and the Solomon Islands in April 2022 offers insight into China’s leveraging of economic support in exchange for securing its geopolitical objectives. Although the agreement included clauses outlining bilateral cooperation on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and law enforcement support, elsewhere the agreement empowers China to “make ship visits to, carry out logistical replacement in, and have stopover and transition in [the] Solomon Islands.” The agreement further allows for the deployment of Chinese forces to the Solomon Islands to “protect the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects.”

The burdening of Pacific Island states by foreign debt has also sparked fears that China may leverage its financial position to further expand its military presence in the South Pacific. Already one of the world’s largest single creditor nations, three of the countries most in debt to China are in the South Pacific - namely, Tonga, Samoa, and Vanuatu.

Despite China’s assertions that its loans offer developing states an invaluable opportunity to invest in critical infrastructure projects, without the conditions often attached to Western aid, recipient states face the risk of being beholden to Beijing’s political ambitions. Assessing the full impact of China’s foreign lending, however, is difficult as the country does not publish any records of its foreign loans, which often contain non-disclosure clauses that prevent recipient states from revealing the terms they agreed to. A January 2022 article from the BBC further noted that China’s state-backed loans often have shorter repayment periods and noticeably higher interest rates than those of other lenders. The already cash-strapped Pacific Island states have little to gain on the long-term from taking on such debt.

Pacific Island states seeking financial aid to address their immediate concerns, such as climate change, unemployment, and underdevelopment, are unlikely to prioritize geopolitical concerns and great power politics over more pressing socio-economic needs. Alleviating these issues solely through China’s foreign lending programs, however, puts them at risk of exposure to the realities of Beijing’s dual-purpose economic outreach.

China’s continued engagement with Pacific Island states through much needed financial aid and investments could play a critical role in determining the region’s future foreign policy decisions. Moreover, it is possible that China may leverage its bilateral and multilateral agreements, financial assistance programs, and development projects to align Pacific Island states with its strategic and military objectives on the long-term - specifically, isolating Taiwan politically; guaranteeing access to strategic ports and waterways across the South Pacific; and, possibly, the building of military bases.

China’s Financial Aid to Pacific Island States. Source: Council on Foreign Relations and the Lowy Institute Pacific Aid Map.

Great Power Politics and the South Pacific

China’s diplomatic efforts in the South Pacific are one part of a grander strategy to carve out its own sphere of influence where it can exercise unquestioned authority without interference from the United States and its allies. China’s political leadership likely envision this policy as being more akin to the Monroe Doctrine - which established Washington’s unquestioned regional hegemony over the Americas - rather than aiming to become the global hegemon.

Crafting a multipolar world, where the United States and China compete as equal hegemons, also requires Beijing to be able to exert influence, project power, and protect its interests in China’s immediate periphery and beyond. Alongside the critical South China Sea, South East Asia, and North East Asia regions, the South Pacific’s strategically located waterways and ports hold immense value for any power seeking to exercise influence over the Pacific and East Asia.

China’s largest hurdle in securing the trust and partnership of Pacific Island states, who are weary of being entangled in great power politics, is the influence already exerted by the United States and Australia, and to a lesser extent New Zealand.

“Geopolitical point-scoring means less than little to anyone whose community is slipping beneath the rising seas” - Frank Bainimarama, Prime Minister of Fiji

Described by American President Dwight D. Eisenhower as an “American Lake,” the United States’ engagement in commercial and defence interests in the South Pacific dates back to as early as 1825. Today Washington maintains a strong military presence in the region through its Indo-Pacific Command, with about 375,000 military and civilian personnel, 2,460 aircraft, and 200 naval vessels, including five aircraft carrier strike groups. Beyond maintaining a significant military presence in the Pacific, the administration of President Joe Biden recently announced its launch of an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework to engage Pacific-littoral states through trade. Although only two Pacific Island states - New Zealand and Fiji - have signed on as “founding members,” the agreement presents Washington with an opportunity to reengage Pacific Island states and counter China’s influence.

Across the Pacific, Australia continues to be the largest bilateral donor, with New Zealand coming in at a close second. Moreover, with decades of diplomatic engagement and cooperation with Pacific Island states, Australia holds a unique position of leadership in the region among Western democracies.

Compounding these challenges, China must navigate a workaround to the costly endeavor of base-building in the South Pacific, particularly in light of the military bases already established there by the United States and Australia. Although it is possible that China may leverage its future investments into the port infrastructure of Pacific Island states to extend the PLAN’s access to docking facilities in the South Pacific, it is unlikely that Beijing will engage in the construction or operation of military bases. Doing so would risk sparking a regional arms race with its American and Australian rivals, while also causing concern among the already conflict-weary Pacific Island states.

American Military Bases and Deployments. Source: Al Jazeera English.

China’s alternative Pacific security framework must also contend with current security pacts and multilateral partnerships, specifically: the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue - bringing together the United States, Australia, India, and Japan; AUKUS - bringing together the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom; and the recently announced Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.

In addition, China’s growing influence in the South Pacific has met resistance from local populations and governments weary of the impact Beijing’s ambitions could have on the sovereignty of their countries. The Solomon Islands’ decision to revoke its recognition of Taiwan in 2019 sparked violent protests that left four killed. In response, China offered to support the Solomon Islands through the deployment of police liaison officers, and the facilitation of training and equipment for local law enforcement. Moreover, the lack of consultation during the drafting of the China-Pacific Island Vision further frustrated Pacific Island states who preferred “negotiation and deliberative discussions” over a unilateral approach. Also expressing their concern were civil society groups in Samoa, Kiribati , and the Solomon Islands who took note of the framework’s potential impact on their press freedom, transparency, and democracy.

Responding to China’s proposed framework, the President of the Federated States of Micronesia, David Panuelo, wrote 18 Pacific Island leaders, including those of Australia and New Zealand, to express concern over what he perceived to be a “smokescreen” for a larger agenda. Panuelo further warned that China was looking to exert control over the sovereignty of Pacific Island states. Panuelo’s comments echo those raised by the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.

“The practical impacts, however, of Chinese control over our communications infrastructure, our ocean territory and the resources within them, and our security space, aside from impacts on our sovereignty is that it increases the chances of China getting into conflict with Australia, Japan, the United States, and New Zealand, on the day when Beijing decides to invade Taiwan. To be clear, that's China's goal: to take Taiwan. Peacefully, if possible; through war, if necessary.” - David Panuelo, President of the Federated States of Micronesia

A lack of foreign bases and reluctant regional partners, however, mean that the prospect of a significant military deployment by Beijing in the South Pacific is highly unlikely anytime soon. Rather, China will likely bide its time and gradually expand its influence by leveraging soft-power mechanisms, such as financial aid programs, diplomatic relations, and investments.

Statecraft and Diplomacy: Responding to China’s Growing Influence

For the United States and Australia to effectively counter China’s growing influence in the South Pacific, a well-crafted, comprehensive, and innovative approach is needed. Washington should steer away from being perceived as dragging Pacific Island states into a new Cold War - a prospect they have no interest in. Rather, the United States and Australia should engage Pacific Island states while taking into consideration the immediate challenges they face, specifically: underdevelopment, climate change, depleting fisheries, a loss of income due to the Covid-19 pandemic’s impact on tourism, and a lack of critical infrastructure.

While both the United States and Australia have overlooked the South Pacific in the past, they should be cautious with their renewed interest and reengagement to avoid being seen as opportunistic powers primarily motivated in their regional engagement by China’s own ambitions, rather than the wellbeing of Pacific Island states.

Lessons Learned?

Initial responses from Washington and Canberra to the China-Pacific Island Vision are a step in the right direction. Australia’s newly elected Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, acknowledged the “complacency” of his predecessor’s administration, and announced plans to increase Australia’s development aid by $354 million over the coming years. Moreover, he pledged to prioritize climate change throughout Australia’s diplomatic engagement in the region.

Kurt Campbell, the White House’s top official for the Indo-Pacific, also held a video conference with Fiji’s Prime Minister, Frank Bainimarama, to discuss enhanced security and economic agreements. Campbell’s meeting with Bainimarama followed a high-level visit by American officials to the Solomon Islands on April 22, where pledges were made to: deepen economic ties; reopen the American embassy in Honiara, the Solomon Islands’ capital; support health programs; deliver Covid-19 vaccinations; support initiatives to address climate change; develop maritime domain awareness; and engage in high-level strategic dialogue. In August 2021, Biden also became the first American president to attend a meeting at the Pacific Island Forum - a multilateral organization facilitating regional cooperation - an important step in demonstrating Washington’s commitment to the region.

Despite these much needed measures, more can be done to help Pacific Island states address their immediate challenges, particularly on climate change. In addition to defending American territories in the Pacific, and fulfilling its defence obligations to Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands, the United States should also consider extending its support to develop the law enforcement and security capabilities of other Pacific Island states. The United States and Australia can also leverage their expertise and resources to help Pacific Island states develop their healthcare programs, education institutions, and critical infrastructure.

Ultimately, efforts to build the socio-economic resiliency of Pacific Island states, while respecting their sovereignty and wishes to avoid being pawns in great power politics, will foster closer bilateral and multilateral ties between the United States and Australia, and their regional partners. More importantly, adopting such a comprehensive approach would offer Pacific Island states a more robust and equitable partnership - particularly in contrast to China’s current engagement with the region.