Instability in the Sahel: A Cycle of Poverty and Violence

Stretching from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Red Sea in the east, Africa’s Sahel region encompasses a vast geographic area with an estimated population of 150 million. Despite its size, the Sahel faces immediate socio-economic, security, and environmental challenges that have stunted the development of regional states, while posing an ever-increasing security risk to the immediate region and beyond.

As a direct consequence of these challenges, roughly 80% of the Sahel’s population lives in extreme poverty, earning less than $1.90 a day. Adding to these pressing issues, endemic corruption, weak governance, and political unrest have further exacerbated the region’s woes. Since 2019, the number of people in five Sahel countries - Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger - who are exposed to starvation has tripled from 3.6 million to 10.5 million.

Although these various issues may appear to be independent, they are, however, intertwined. Contextualizing the cyclical nature of these issues is imperative to identifying a nexus point at which they meet, a critical step needed to propose any possible solutions.

Africa’s Sahel Region. Source: Deutsche Welle.

Setting the Stage: Anarchy in Post-Ghaddafi Libya

Eleven years since the Arab Spring - a series of antigovernment protests, uprisings, and armed rebellions - swept the Arab world in response to economic stagnation and decades of corruption, the North African state of Libya continues to be plagued by instability, political infighting, and extremist movements.

Prolonged political turmoil in the oil-rich state was an unintended consequence following the overthrow of its then-dictator Muammar Ghaddafi, who ruled Libya with an iron fist for 42 years. Ghaddafi’s brutal monopolization of power was marked by systemic human rights abuses, endemic corruption, and the centralization of power under his immediate family. Decades of mismanagement under an autocratic regime left a post-Ghaddafi Libya ill-prepared to deal with the consequences of the sudden power vacuum that gripped Libya following his death in October 2011.

“Mali, Niger, Chad, all these countries to some extent are having problems because we do not have stability in Libya” - Mathias Hounkpe, head of the Mali country office for the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA)

Since his death, Libya has grappled with a number of issues, including: a civil war; dozens of autonomous militias operating without oversight or accountability; a surge in kidnappings and extortions by organized criminal elements; human smugglers operating freely in the country’s near-ungovernable south; and proxy wars driven by competing foreign and regional powers.

While the fall of Ghaddafi’s regime did not directly cause the internal problems found across the Sahel, it did accelerate and compound these issues, with disastrous effects. The flow of Libyan weapons looted from the state’s then-unguarded arsenals, and the facilitation of financing and recruitment across the Sahel’s fluid borders, further emboldened various rebel groups and extremist movements in their fight against regional governments.

Territorial Control in Libya, as of February 18, 2022. Source: Dzsihad Hadelli.

Regional Rivals: Al Qaeda and the Islamic State

The fall of northern Mali in early 2012 to an unconventional alliance of rebels fighting for the liberation of an independent state in the name of the region’s Tuareg ethnic group, and Al Qaeda (AQ)-aligned fighters, paved the way for a surge in violence that continues to wreak havoc across the Sahel today.

Groups aligned to AQ and the Islamic State (IS) have claimed responsibility for hundreds of terrorist attacks and criminal activities across the Sahel. Despite being at odds ideologically, AQ and IS-affiliated groups initially coordinated attacks, and even agreed to carve out mutually-respected spheres of influence.

From Partners to Rivals

This precarious partnership, however, ended in February 2020 when IS and AQ clashed in Mali afterthe former’s fighters ventured into the latter’s territory. As each group denounced the other as an apostate, a series of reprisals and revenge attacks by both has left hundreds of militants dead in a battle for supremacy across the Sahel.

Operating on behalf of AQ and IS are three key organizations - two being AQ-affiliated, and one being tied to IS. In the past, AQ maintained a presence in the northwest African and Sahel regions through its offshoot, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM). In March 2017, however, a merger by various AQ affiliates brought about Jama’at Nasr al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an umbrella group in defacto control of AQ affairs across the Sahel.

Directly competing with them is the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), which came to prominence in 2016. Originating as a splinter group of Boko Haram, a former AQ affiliate operating in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, ISWAP also indirectly controls the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), an operationally independent sub-group based in the border regions between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. In June 2021, ISWAP fighters attacked and overran Boko Haram positions in their traditional hideouts within Nigeria’s Sambisa Forest, leading to the death of its leader and eventual decline, consequently swelling ISWAP’s ranks with hundreds of defecting Boko Haram fighters.

Active Militant Islamist Groups in Africa by Activity, as of December 31, 2021. Source: Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

Operational Differences

In addition to their ideological differences, both ISWAP and JNIM operationalize different tactics. In contrast to ISWAP, who continue to brutally target civilians, JNIM’s leadership have been cautious to focus the group’s efforts on targeting regional governments, specifically: local officials; suspected informers; soldiers and police officers; and traditional leaders who cooperate with state authorities. In JNIM-controlled territories, dissent is often rooted out with discretion, rather than indiscriminate violence, through the specific targeting of vocal dissidents and collaborators. ISWAP fighters, however, often favour brutalizing populations to maintain control and exert their influence. Despite varying priorities for targets, both ISWAP and JNIM continue to target religious minorities, and Western citizens and officials equally.

In minimizing their targeting of civilians, JNIM has successfully capitalized on local grievances to make noticeable gains on the ground. Moreover, by exploiting public frustrations over government neglect, corruption, and unaddressed socio-economic inequalities, JNIM further undermines the authority of regional states. The group has also leveraged ethnic conflicts and divisions to gain support among rural communities.

Still Image from a Propaganda Video Released by JNIM in March 2018. Source: Long War Journal.

Expansion Beyond the Sahel

More recently, both terrorist organizations have expanded their operations south of the Sahel into the west African coastal states of Benin, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire. A string of violent attacks in northern Benin between November 2021 and January 2022 left several dead. The country further experienced its deadliest attacks yet on February 8 and 10, 2022, when patrols in its W National Park were struck by improvised explosive devices, killing one soldier and eight park officers. Neighboring Togo suffered its first terrorist attack in November 2021 when militants raided a security post on the Burkina Faso border. A more recent ambush in the country’s north on May 20, 2022, left 8 soldiers killed, and another 13 wounded. In the first half of 2021 alone, Côte d’Ivoire suffered multiple attacks targeting its security forces.

While these states have no historical precedent for Islamist insurgencies, their internal governance and socio-economic issues have ensured that the appropriate conditions for an organized extremist or criminal organization to exploit local frustrations are present. A decade of instability to their north may be the perfect catalyst for further regional destabilization.

Although rivals in practice, ISWAP and JNIM share common goals at heart, specifically - the overthrow of regional governments, whom they see as inherently corrupt and illegitimate; the expulsion of Western forces operating in the region; and the expansion, and eventual exportation, of their parallel, though distinct, ideologies.

Trends in Fatalities Linked to Militant Islamist Groups in Africa, by Theater. Source: Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back

Ideology alone, however, is not enough to drive recruitment and expansion on behalf of ISWAP and JNIM. Rather, both groups could not continue to expand and operate across the Sahel, and beyond, without support from the local populace. The fundamental nexus point bringing extremist and criminal groups together with local populations is a common frustration with inefficient and neglectful governance by corrupt political leaders who are as distant to many locals as a foreign power is. In addition to exploiting socio-economic grievances, extremist groups are often willing to fill in the gaps left by government neglect by providing essential services and security to gain the trust of locals.

Combatting ideological extremists with military force alone will not yield the desired results of disarming and delegitimizing these groups, as the recent case study of the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan has shown.

Additionally, human rights abuses and extrajudicial killings at the hands of regional security forces, foreign powers, and mercenaries, have undermined counterterrorism operations across the Sahel. Such incidents often arm extremist groups with the material they need to craft a tailored narrative portraying their efforts as just, further boosting their popular support and bolstering their recruitment efforts.

Corruption: The Root of All Evil

To the detriment of their stability and efficacy in governance, unchecked corruption has exacerbated the effects of critical issues faced by an already impoverished Sahel region. To the surprise of no one, Sahel states occupy some of the lowest rankings on the 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index.

By leaving corruption unchecked, and failing to provide their citizens with basic public services and infrastructure, governments across the Sahel have alienated many within their borders, consequently driving a wedge between governing officials and their respective constituents.

The looting of treasuries and mismanagement of public funds by the very officials sworn in to protect them further contributes to stagnant economic conditions. To extremist groups and criminal organizations alike, a weakened economy creates the perfect environment to recruit new members by exploiting an impoverished population increasingly desperate for a source of income.

Not only does corruption erode public trust in government, rather it hampers the efforts of local security forces to combat organized criminal activities, extremist groups, and other threats to public safety.

Estimated Number of People Facing Food Insecurity Across the Sahel, as of February 2022. Source: European Commission.

Different Countries, Same Problems

In August 2020, a leaked confidential government audit of defence spending in Niger found that at least $137 million had been lost due to malpractice and grafting over the course of 8 years. The impact of shady procurement processes and undelivered equipment was further compounded by a lack of accountability from Nigerien authorities.

Financial irregularities, however, are not only a feature of Nigerien politics. A November 2018 report, produced by the Canadian government on behalf of the country’s international donors, found that between 2005 and 2017, more than $1.2 billion was irregularly spent by the Malian government. It was estimated that 35.5% of this amount was lost due to embezzlement, with the rest falling prey to financial mismanagement. To contextualize this figure, the wasted funds represented the value of approximately 44% of all development assistance received by Mali annually.

Similar issues plaguing the region have held back the implementation of good governance practices and genuine reform, specifically the Sahel’s development has been held back by: a comprehensive system of bribery; deep-rooted networks of patronage and clientelism; unchecked grafting and embezzlement; and poor financial management.

Climate Change: A Looming Threat

Amidst all these challenges, the specter of climate change casts its long shadow over an already troubled part of the world. The arid Sahel region is expected to become gradually hotter due to changing weather patterns as a result of human-caused carbon emissions.

Extreme weather events - such as floods, droughts, and increasingly sporadic rainfall - are also predicted to increase in occurrence and severity. In a region heavily reliant on agriculture as the primary means of sustaining livelihoods, any upheaval of the Sahel’s already delicate environment threatens to plunge it, and neighboring regions, into greater turmoil.

In addition to exposing local populations to the risk of food insecurity and extreme poverty, climate change further lays the foundation for extremist and criminal organizations to exploit worsening socio-economic conditions on the ground to bolster their recruitment efforts and carry out violent attacks, contributing to the future destabilization of the Sahel.

Moreover, the region’s relatively high population growth rate, despite the prevalence of extreme poverty and insecurity, threatens to add more pressure on the Sahel’s already scarce water and pastoral resources.

Growing competition over increasingly finite resources, and the loss of invaluable fertile soil to desertification, also exposes the Sahel to the possibility of a substantial displacement of people in the near future. With this risk comes the potential for a further exacerbation of the ethno-religious tensions already plaguing the region.

On May 20, 2022, the United Nations warned that 18 million people across the Sahel face severe hunger in the next three months, citing the compounded effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change, inflation, and a shortage of wheat as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Merely providing relief funds with little oversight or accountability, while overlooking the issues that left the region ill-prepared for emergency situations, does little to address these challenges on the long-term.

“A combination of violence, insecurity, deep poverty and record-high food prices is exacerbating malnutrition and driving millions to the fringes of survival.” - Martin Griffiths, head of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Expected Population Growth in the Western Sahel and Northern Nigeria. Source: Atlantic Council.

Breaking the Sahel’s Cycle of Instability

Contextualizing the Sahel’s ongoing struggle with insecurity and socio-economic issues, against the backdrop of political and financial mismanagement, makes it clear that the region’s woes are cyclical in nature.

Unchecked corruption, the abuse of political offices, and embezzlement hamper the region’s economic development while robbing local populations of access to critical services such as healthcare, education, and basic infrastructure.

Neglecting these areas further compounds the effects of a stagnating economy by creating a brain drain at home, while leaving vast parts of the Sahel underdeveloped and ill-prepared to absorb the shocks of environmental, economic, or health emergencies.

Moreover, a stagnant economy directly contributes to high unemployment rates - a dangerous phenomenon in a region struggling with extremism and organized crime where roughly 64% of the population are below the age of 25. As a growing population faces increasingly challenging economic conditions at home, the narrative of terrorist, extremist, and criminal networks - who are often willing to pay recruits - becomes increasingly appealing.

In attempting to suppress these networks, regional governments inadvertently delegitimize their own authority as a direct result of their heavy handed tactics, human rights abuses, economic mismanagement, and neglect of the local populace. This, in turn, exacerbates the region’s insecurity by driving impoverished populations further into the arms of groups fighting government forces and towards illicit means of earning a livelihood.

In response to these issues, Sahel states look outwards, towards the United States, the European Union, Russia, and China, to procure arms in the name of combatting terrorism and crime, while seeking humanitarian aid to provide relief from pressing economic conditions. The lack of accountability or transparency, from both regional states and extra-regional powers donating funds and exporting arms, feeds directly into the Sahel’s endemic corruption.

Unchecked, this corruption eventually foments enough public outrage, amidst stalled economic growth and a lack of opportunities, to trigger instability that often manifests one of three outcomes: a military takeover; intensified insurgencies and social unrest; or increasingly autocratic governments who challenge the constitutional boundaries of their respective states. Neither of these outcomes address any of the Sahel’s most pressing challenges, leading to a repetition of the cycle starting from political and economic mismanagement, spearheaded by corruption.

One Step at a Time

This cycle is the fundamental model the Sahel region is doomed to repeat until the situation on the ground becomes unsustainable, as it did in the Arab Spring in 2011 and northern Mali in 2012.

For Sahel states to break the cyclical nature of their problems, they will need significant political and economic reform, starting with the implementation of policies that promote transparency and accountability. This includes the rebuilding of trust in public institutions by creating robust agencies with clear, accessible mandates and mechanisms to showcase how funding was allocated.

Moreover, any comprehensive solution will require a coordination of efforts across the Sahel, in close partnership with the economic and political powerhouses of Washington and Brussels, to ensure that no gaps are left to be exploited. Intergovernmental forums such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the G5 Sahel, and the African Union offer strategic platforms for Sahel states to facilitate regional cooperation. A policy of engaging with forward-thinking international partners interested in capacity building, sustainable development, and regional stability should be pursued, while relationships with autocratic regimes driven by self-interest should be avoided.

Sahel states must also revise their understanding of the region’s security framework by reforming their militaries and police into well-regulated, professional forces. This rework requires a shifting away from solely relying on military force to combat the region’s insurgencies in exchange for a whole-of-government approach that tackles insecurity through strategic military deployments without neglecting the immediate needs of the people. Specifically, Sahel states should aim to provide their citizens access to healthcare facilities, education, and relief efforts to mitigate the effects of famine and drought.

Finally, the Sahel is in dire need of ambitious political leadership, with a long-term vision. Specifically, the region needs political leaders and lawmakers who recognize how much work is needed to address the inevitable threat of climate change and the challenges of a growing population. Formulating any comprehensive response to these issues requires engagement with local stakeholders, private sector actors, international partners, and other Sahel states.

Genuine reform, however, is often easier said than done.