Russia’s Military Debacle in Ukraine

Eleven weeks into Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has failed to achieve any major strategic gains on the ground to justify what he markets at home as a “special military operation.” Initial military deployments, and repeated attempts to capture the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv, suggest that Russia’s leadership had originally planned for a swift war by toppling the government of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and installing a pro-Kremlin regime in its place. Having faced significant resistance in Kyiv, Russian forces withdrew north across the border into Russia and Belarus in early April.

Reassessing Objectives

Setting aside his ambitious objectives at the start of the war, Putin appears to have now adopted narrower territorial objectives - specifically: capturing the cities of Mariupol and Odessa, and by extension Ukraine’s Black Sea coast; securing a land bridge with the occupied Crimean Peninsula; occupying the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; and gaining access to the breakaway Transnistria region of Moldova, which is currently under Russian control.

“The Russians met with more resistance from Ukraine than they expected, and their own military’s performance revealed a number of significant internal challenges, forcing them to adjust their initial military objectives, fall back from Kyiv and focus on the Donbas.” - Avril Haines, US Director of National Intelligence

Assessment of Terrain Control and Russian Military Maneuvering in Ukraine as of May 12, 2022. Source: Institute of War.

Ukrainian Counteroffensive

Despite its numerical advantage, overwhelming firepower, air superiority, and naval supremacy in the Black Sea, Russia’s military has faltered on multiple fronts, suffering numerous setbacks owing to repeated miscalculations, strategic failures, and stiff Ukrainian resistance. Having defended Kyiv from repeated Russian assaults, Ukrainian forces successfully launched counteroffensives north and east of Ukraine’s second largest city, Kharkiv, which has witnessed fierce fighting since the onset of Russia’s invasion.

These counteroffensives come on the heel of a series of tactical and strategic losses facing the Russian military, including: the sinking of Russia’s Black Sea fleet’s flagship, the Moskva; the loss of at least twelve major generals and numerous senior officers; the death of at least 15,000 soldiers; and the destruction of at least 3,000 pieces of large equipment, including more than 660 battle tanks, 350 armored fighting vehicles, 700 infantry fighting vehicles. 40 helicopters, and 25 combat aircraft.

Comparison of Russian and Ukrainian Military Capabilities in 2022. Source: Statista.

Staggering losses and an underperforming military have left many Western analysts surprised, particularly given recent observations indicating the modernization and professionalization of Russia’s military. Understanding Russia’s failure in Ukraine thus far requires an evaluation of several key factors.

Logistical and Supply Issues

“Gentlemen, the officer who doesn’t know his communications and supply as well as his tactics is totally useless.” - General George S. Patton

Since the start of their military operations in Ukraine, Russian forces have repeatedly encountered logistical challenges, including difficulties in refueling vehicles, resupplying troops and transporting wounded soldiers.

Underpinning all these issues is a dependence on railways, so much so that Russia uniquely maintains an auxiliary service known as the Railway Troops (Zheleznodorozhniye Voiska). The force’s 10 brigades are tasked with protecting and maintaining Russia’s railways for use in combat, while supporting frontline deployments with critical supplies and conducting emergency repairs.

Recognizing the vulnerability of Russia’s railway-reliant supply system early on, Ukrainian forces purposefully targeted critical hubs connecting the Russian and Ukrainian railway lines. Moreover, the Russian Army’s failure to capture strategic logistical and railway hubs has further denied Russian forces the benefits that come with secure supply lines, consequently lowering morale. Without secure railheads nearby, the effective operational capability of Russian forces is severely limited.

Facing serious issues in securing supplies by rail, the Russian Army has been forced to supply its forces by road, a much riskier and inefficient solution to Russia’s supply woes. Ukrainian forces regularly target the often-unprotected Russian convoys carrying essential supplies, such as fuel, ammunition, and food.

Infographic Released by the Ukrainian Military Advising Citizens on Where to Target Russian Vehicles with Molotov Cocktails. Source: Ukrainian General Staff, Twitter.

Further exacerbating these issues is the poor maintenance record of various Russian supply and combat vehicles alike. One notorious incident early on in the war saw a 64 kilometer (40 mile) convoy of Russian tanks, armoured vehicles, and artillery stall for days roughly 30 kilometers outside of Kyiv. According to the United Kingdom’s Defence Ministry, both Ukrainian resistance and mechanical breakdowns contributed to the failure of the convoy’s advance towards the Ukrainian capital.

Russian forces have also been observed using civilian trucks to replace military-grade ones lost in combat, despite a clear difference in battlefield capability and carrying capacity.

The capability of Russian forces to repurpose damaged vehicles and equipment has also been limited due to the lack of recovery vehicles embedded within frontline battalions. This has led to numerous instances of strategic assets being abandoned across Ukraine, including: self-propelled artillery, tanks, armoured vehicles, and sophisticated air defence and electronic warfare systems.

Corruption and Mismanagement

Years of unchecked corruption, nepotism, and a lack of accountability have left Russia’s military and security institutions ill-prepared for any serious conflict. Accounts highlighting fuel shortages, expired rations, and poorly maintained hardware across the frontline are a testament to the scope of the graft and embezzlement issues plaguing Russia’s defence sector. Moreover, they offer an explanation into the disorganization, low morale, and ineffective military operations that have bogged down Russian offensives in Ukraine, at great cost to Russian lives and military hardware.

In a March 9 letter addressed to Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, Oleksandr Novikov, the head of Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption Prevention, said that the embezzlement of public funds in Russia has made an "invaluable contribution" to the defence of his country. "Russian means and support resources for the attack on Ukraine were stolen even before they were accumulated on the border of the two states," Novikov wrote.

Further hindering the effectiveness of Russia’s military is an antiquated defence procurement process dominated by self-serving oligarchs and corrupt political figures, whose luxurious lifestyles do not match up with their official incomes.

Russian Military Spending, as of 2020. Source: Al Jazeera English.

In 2012, local press reported a $26 million contract being awarded to a Russian arms company for the development of an aircraft system to intercept nonstrategic missiles. The system’s research and development, however, never took place. A consequent investigation by the military prosecutor’s office found that the firm had instead assigned fraudulent contracts to shell companies, some of which were registered to the addresses of public bathrooms in Russia’s Samara region. In another case from 2016, a separate firm responsible for supplying radio navigation equipment and control systems for high-precision ammunition was found to have imitated research and development activities to facilitate the theft of defence funds through fraudulent contracts.

Left unchecked, the rampant corruption crippling Russia’s public, private, and defence sectors will continue to overshadow any progress Russian forces make on the ground. More importantly, these issues will continue to erode the trust Russian soldiers and civilians have in their institutions, and by extension their political and military leadership.

Intelligence Failures

In 2020, Russia spent $69 billion, or 28% of its annual budget, on its security services. In constant competition for funds and Putin’s good graces are three principal agencies; Russia’s primary intelligence agency, the Federal Security Service (FSB); the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); and military intelligence (GRU).

Each security agency jealously guards its own sphere of influence, while treating the other with suspicion and distrust. This competition extends down to the intra-agency level, where different groups often compete to pursue unilateral policies, sometimes to the detriment of the organization and its interests.

One key factor behind Russia’s poor performance on the battlefield has been a clear failure of intelligence collection and analysis on part of Russia’s security agencies. Overly optimistic predictions of the war’s outcome undoubtedly played a role in badly preparing an overconfident Russian military with inaccurate presumptions over Ukraine’s capability and resolve to defend its territory.

Russia’s intelligence agencies also appear to have overlooked the modernization, retraining and procurement reforms undergone by the Ukrainian Armed Forces since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Nor did their assessments account for intense popular resistance by the Ukrainian populace, tens of thousands of whom have organized to defend their cities and villages with state-provided arms.

A deeper analysis, however, suggests that the failure of Russia’s intelligence agencies in Ukraine goes beyond ineffective collection and analysis. Rather, many Western analysts have speculated over the possibility that Russia’s intelligence agencies were unwilling to provide assessments critical to, or in contradiction of, Putin’s vision and narrative for fear of retribution. What negative assessments that did make it through Putin’s shroud of self-censorship are likely to have been ignored.

Putin’s Presidential Administration, a secretive organization controlling the flow of information to and from the president, is likely to have played a role in restricting his access to critical assessments.

Strategic and tactical disasters on the battlefield have also set Putin on a collision course with some of his intelligence agencies. The foreign intelligence branch of the FSB in particular has felt the ire of Putin. On March 9, Sergey Beseda and his deputy, Anatoly Bolyukh, were placed under house arrest. Beseda oversaw the FSB’s foreign intelligence branch, and both men undoubtedly played an important role in formulating Russia’s assessments of Ukrainian resistance before the war.

Putin’s already small inner circle appears to be getting even smaller as the war in Ukraine prolongs and a badly needed victory continues to elude the Kremlin. It is likely that the coming months will see a growing divide between Putin, his security and intelligence leaders - whom he blames for faulty intelligence and poor performance on the battlefield, and Russia’s notorious oligarchs - whose ill-gotten gains are at risk due to crippling Western sanctions targeting almost all of Russia’s economic sectors.

Number of Sanctions Against Russia Since 2014. Source: Correctiv.

Lessons for Observers

With its armed forced bogged down in the Donbas region, and having retreated from Ukraine’s north and northeast after multiple failed offensives and staggering losses of life and equipment, Russia’s performance in Ukraine leaves little to be desired. The Russian military’s repeated strategic and tactical errors, however, have shed light on three important pillars essential for the conduct of conventional, modern warfare.

Building an Effective Command Structure

First, Russia’s top-down military structure offers little flexibility or incentive for individual units to take advantage of opportunities that may present themselves on the battlefield. While this is driven, in part, by an antiquated and rigid command structure, the lack of professionalism and discipline evident within the ranks of the Russian military further highlights the need for a complete reorganization and restructuring of Russia’s military, starting from the top. Recent accounts documenting cases of looting, rape, and the indiscriminate killing of civilians all amount to war crimes conducted by the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine. Similar allegations surfaced throughout Russia’s intervention in Syria, but were consequently overlooked, indicating a clear lack of accountability within the Russian military.

Coordinating Intelligence Efforts

Second, the ongoing inter and intra-agency rivalry plaguing Russia’s intelligence community have seriously hampered the capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces on the battlefield. In their failure, or unwillingness, to provide accurate assessments of the situation in Ukraine, Russia’s intelligence agencies helped create an aura of overconfidence in the Kremlin that has backfired. At the heart of their failure is a flawed system of patronage, paranoia and fear put in place by Putin since his coming to power at the end of the Soviet Union. This system has allowed for endemic corruption to plague Russia’s economy, while hampering the efficacy of their public and private sectors. Moreover, Russia’s defence and procurement industries continue to suffer from embezzlement, grafting, and bureaucratic secrecy, further hindering Russia’s prospects of developing a modernized, effective, and battle-ready military.

Military Might Alone Cannot Win Wars

Third, while the staggering losses suffered by Russia can be partly attributed to US intelligence, and billions of dollars worth of military and economic support from across the North Atlantic Treat Organization (NATO) backing the Ukrainian war effort, it is ultimately the failure of Russia’s military to adapt to key logistical challenges early on that has taken a serious toll on Russian lives, equipment, and morale. Defenceless supply convoys, a failure to secure strategic railway hubs, uncoordinated spearheads and paratrooper landings, and a chronic shortage of supplies have all directly contributed to an abysmal performance on the ground.

Hostomel Airport: A Case Study in Force Preparedness and Coordination

As damaging as it has been for Russia to underestimate the capabilities of Ukraine, overestimating the operational capabilities of its own armed forces has resulted in a number of strategic failures. Early on in the war, Russia deployed its elite airborne units, the VDV, alongside Mi-35 and Ka-52 attack helicopters, in an operation to seize the strategic Hostomel Airport, located 10 kilometers northwest of Kyiv. The original plan was to use Hostomel as a staging ground and aerial supply hub to support a much anticipated encirclement of Kyiv.

Russian Advances and Ukrainian Counteroffensives Around Kyiv March 2 - April 2. Source: Financial Times.

Despite their possession of the element of surprise, and aerial superiority in both numbers and firepower, Ukrainian aerial defences were left largely intact, leaving VDV troops deployed at Hostomel without the backing of crucial air support. Relief units from the Russian Army, having broken through Ukrainian defences along the Belarussian border, joined the VDV and attempted, multiple times, to breakout of Hostomel and into the nearby towns of Bucha and Irpin, suffering significant causalities with each failed attempt.

Rather than adapt to the shifting situation on the ground, the VDV and Russian Army units around Hostomel became a largely static force, undersupplied and waiting for relief from the now-infamous 40-mile-long convoy to advance and encircle Kyiv. With no clear orders to advance or retreat, and lacking secure supply lines, Russian Army and VDV units at Hostomel were left at the mercy of nearby Ukrainian artillery units and drone strikes.

Russian forces were only given an order in the form of a general retreat from the Kyiv region on March 29, leaving behind a trail of destroyed equipment and many casualties.

The events at Hostomel, and to a greater extent Russia’s botched offensive toward Kyiv, offer key insights into the structural problems at the core of the Russian military. An apparent lack of force readiness was compounded by the decision to leave soldiers in the dark about the invasion. Consequently, many of the conscripts drafted for Putin’s “special operation” were left in disarray, having deployed to Belarus on what they thought were routine training exercises. Moreover, the reliance of Russian forces on unencrypted radios to communicate sensitive information further points to a lack of preparation.

Russian Sukhoi (SU) 27 Fighter Aircraft.

Airforce? What Airforce?

Force readiness issues, however, are not restricted to the Russian Army. Russian jet pilots received on average between 80 to 100 hours of flight time a year before the war, a significantly smaller amount of time than their Western counterparts. Additionally, they lack access to extensive training ranges and advanced flight simulators, tools that are integral to the planning of complex aerial operations.

At the outbreak of war, it was widely assumed that the vast resources of the Russian Air Force would be mobilized to swiftly destroy Ukraine’s air defence assets and combat aircraft. Instead, and to the surprise of many, the Russian air force has thus far been unable to achieve complete air superiority beyond the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine.

Despite early attempts to knock out Ukraine’s airport infrastructure and aerial defence systems with cruise and ballistic missiles, in March American defence officials assessed Ukraine’s air and missile defences to be “effective and in use.” Moreover, the failure of Russia’s air force to secure battlefield-wide air superiority has offered their Ukrainian counterpart enough room to operate its Turkish-sourced Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and conduct strikes targeting advancing Russian columns with great effectiveness.

Situation in the Donbas Region, Updated as of May 13. Source: Financial Times.

Beyond a War of Attrition

In the short-term, Putin is likely to double his efforts to exert full control over the Donbas region and Ukraine’s Black Sea coast. Considering how fierce Ukrainian resistance to Russian occupation has been so far, and how difficult the capture of Mariupol has proven to be, Russia’s military leadership are likely weary of committing to another costly siege in Odessa, the last major Ukrainian port city on the Black Sea. Capturing the city, however, is a must if Russia is to accomplish its newly reassessed strategic objectives in Ukraine.

Moreover, it is unlikely that Russia will address the logistical, structural, and leadership issues hampering its military, as these are systemic problems that would require a top-down overhaul and modernization of its armed forces.

It is likely, however, that Putin will further tighten his iron grasp on Russia’s political, socio-economic, and military circles as he reels in from the ongoing consequences of his botched invasion.

Politically, it can be expected that the Russian state will continue to mobilize its security apparatus to crush any public dissent, particularly those opinions that go against the official narrative on the war. Economically, Russia has yet to feel the full brunt of Western sanctions. It is likely that the Russian economy will not fully recover from their effect for years to come. Moreover, Russia’s key economic industries, particularly energy, will suffer as states and corporations alike avoid doing business with Russia. In addition, should the situation on the ground continue in a status quo stalemate, the coming months will probably see Putin’s frustrations manifest into political purges directed at senior military and intelligence leaders.

The Kremlin will also continue saber-rattling and warning of the potential outbreak of nuclear war to deter the West from continuing its material, logistical, and financial support of Ukraine. Although the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used is low, the political cost of losing the war in Ukraine could be too high to ensure the survival of Putin and his regime. Consequently, Putin could resort to more drastic actions to break the long, brutal war of attrition expected in Ukraine. These actions could include a full mobilization, enacting Draconian laws at home, and even the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

In an assessment provided to US lawmakers on March 10, Avril Haines, the US Director of National Intelligence, argued that Putin would only use a nuclear weapon if he saw an existential threat to Russia or his regime. “We do think that [Putin’s perception of an existential threat] could be the case in the event that he perceives that he is losing the war in Ukraine, and that Nato in effect is either intervening or about to intervene in that context, which would obviously contribute to a perception that he is about to lose the war in Ukraine,” Haines told the committee hearing.

By invading Ukraine, Putin has put himself, and by extension his regime, at risk of losing everything at home and on the international stage. Moreover, his reckless actions have set Russia back by decades, having made it an international pariah more akin to North Korea than a global superpower.

For now, he has placed his bets against the will power of the United States and its allies to back Ukraine, hoping to outlast them in the face of soaring energy prices, rising inflation, and global supply chain disruptions. In doing so, he has bogged Russia down in a war of attrition, with no end in sight.

Regardless of whether the Russian army is able to make gains on the ground in the coming months or not, the systemic issues responsible for a series of humiliating defeats and strategic losses at the hands of an outgunned, outnumbered Ukrainian military will continue to plague Russia’s military until thorough reforms, from the top-down, are carried out. With Putin and his inner circle at the helm, it is unlikely that any such reforms will take place.